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Abstract
Humans and other animals can adapt their social behavior in response to environmen-
tal cues including the feedback obtained through experience. Nevertheless, the effects of
the experience-based learning of players in evolution and maintenance of cooperation in
social dilemma games remain relatively unclear. Some previous literature showed that
mutual cooperation of learning players is difficult or requires a sophisticated learning
model. In the context of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we numerically examine the
performance of a reinforcement learning model. Our model modifies those of Karandikar
et al. (1998), Posch et al. (1999), and Macy and Flache (2002) in which players satisfice if
the obtained payoff is larger than a dynamic threshold. We show that players obeying the
modified learning mutually cooperate with high probability if the dynamics of threshold
is not too fast and the association between the reinforcement signal and the action in
the next round is sufficiently strong. The learning players also perform efficiently against
the reactive strategy. In evolutionary dynamics, they can invade a population of players
adopting simpler but competitive strategies. Our version of the reinforcement learning
model does not complicate the previous model and is sufficiently simple yet flexible. It
may serve to explore the relationships between learning and evolution in social dilemma
situations.
Keywords: cooperation, direct reciprocity, Prisoner’s Dilemma, reinforcement learning
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1 Introduction
Human beings and other animals often cooperate with each other even in social dilemma sit-
uations where to not cooperate is apparently a rational choice. A standard framework in
which social dilemma situations are studied is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD) and its
variants. Many theoretical mechanisms for emergence and maintenance of cooperation in
social dilemma games have been reported thus far (Axelrod, 1984; Boyd & Richerson, 1985;
Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010).
Most of these mechanisms do not deal with the adaptation or learning of individuals. We
use the term learning to refer to individual learning (i.e., experience-based adaptation), but
not to social learning (i.e., imitation). Learning implies that an individual takes advantage
of the history of the games that it has played to perform better in subsequent rounds. A
learning individual changes behavior on the basis of some statistics of the game results. Lab-
oratory experiments suggest that humans do learn during sequences of games (Camerer, 2003;
Glimcher et al., 2009). The learning of the social behavior of animals, including humans,
has been modeled in various game and non-game situations (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965;
Cross, 1983; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Camerer, 2003)
Learning in a game is relevant only in an iterated game. It is well known that mutual cooper-
ation can be optimal in the iterated PD (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). Action rules that have
mainly been considered in the context of the iterated PD are those that do not adjust conditional
probabilities of cooperation upon experience. A player using a look-up table that relates the
next action to the outcome of the game in the current and past few rounds belongs to this class
(Axelrod, 1984; Kraines & Kraines, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1990;
Nowak, 1990; Lindgren, 1991; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Nowak, 2006;
Sigmund, 2010). This important class includes well-known strategies such as the tit-for-tat
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(TFT). However, the flexibility of such a strategy appears to be limited.
Players using reinforcement learning, on which we focus in this study, exploit information
about past encounters to adapt the probability of cooperation conditioned by the outcome
of the game in a couple of past rounds. Because of their flexibility, such learning players
may be strong competitors in the iterated PD. If learning players compete relatively well in a
population, the learning behavior may spread to become dominant in the population through
evolutionary dynamics. Nevertheless, the possible roles of reinforcement learning in the it-
erated PD, either in favor of or against the promotion of cooperation, are relatively unex-
plored. In fact, players using reinforcement learning have generally been unsuccessful in the
PD and other social dilemma games (Macy, 1996; Sandholm & Crites, 1996; Posch et al., 1999;
Taiji & Ikegami, 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002; Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009). Although an artificial
neural network model, for example, enables mutual cooperation (Gutnisky & Zanutto, 2004),
such a complicated mechanism may not be implemented by humans or other animals. It seems
that the current understanding of social dilemmas is mostly based on studies in the fields of
evolutionary biology and economics. Because experience-based learning, and reinforcement
learning in particular, is quite evident in humans and other animals, both in terms of behavior
and neural activities (Camerer, 2003; Glimcher et al., 2009), clarifying the role of reinforcement
learning in the iterated PD may provide an additional understanding of how subjects cope with
social dilemmas.
In the present study, we numerically examine a variant of the reinforcement learning model
(Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002) in the iterated PD. Follow-
ing Macy and Flache (2002), we call the original model the Bush–Mosteller (BM) model. A
player obeying the BM reinforcement learning (BM player for short) would continue an action
(i.e., cooperate or defect) after gaining a relatively large payoff and would switch the action oth-
erwise. If the threshold payoff above which the player satisfices, which is called the aspiration
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level, is fixed, BM players can mutually cooperate (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Macy, 1991;
Macy, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002; Izquierdo et al., 2007; Izquierdo et al., 2008).
The BM player with the fixed aspiration level studied in these articles is essentially the same
as Pavlov that only uses the information about the immediate past (Kraines & Kraines, 1989;
Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). Pavlov is known to be exploited by the unconditional defector and
behave too generously to the unconditional cooperator.
Real subjects may adapt the aspiration level in response to the results of the game (Simon, 1959).
The BM model with the adaptive aspiration level is not known to yield a large probability of
mutual cooperation except in some limited cases (Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999;
Macy & Flache, 2002). We remark that performance of other reinforcement learning mod-
els with the adaptive aspiration level have also been investigated in the PD and other games
(Pazgal, 1997; Kim, 1999; Palomino & Vega-Redondo, 1999; Dixon, 2000; Bo¨rgers & Sarin, 2000;
Oechssler, 2002; Bendor et al., 2003; Napel, 2003; Cho & Matsui, 2005). In the temporal dif-
ference learning, which is a dominant form of reinforcement learning in the brain, dopamine
neurons represent the difference between the obtained reward and the dynamic expected reward
that changes according to the subject’s experience (Schultz et al., 1997; Montague & Berns, 2002;
Daw & Doya, 2006; Glimcher et al., 2009). The reinforcement signal in the BM model with the
adaptive aspiration level is given by the difference between the obtained reward and the dy-
namically changing aspiration level such that the BM model with the adaptive aspiration level
is at least loosely connected to neural evidence.
We show that a simple modification of the BM model with the adaptive aspiration level
drastically changes the behavior of the player. The modified BM player mutually cooperates
with a large probability and is competitive in evolutionary dynamics. The modification is
done such that the reinforcement signal is reflected to the action selection in the next round
fairly strongly. The aspiration level must adapt with a low to intermediate learning rate for
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sustaining cooperation. It should be noted that our modification to the BM model does not
introduce an additional complexity to the original BM model with the adaptive aspiration
level (Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002).
2 Model
We consider the symmetric two-person PD whose payoff matrix is given by


C D
C R S
D T P

, (1)
where T > R > P > S and R > (T + S)/2. The entries of Eq. (1) represent the payoffs that
the row player gains. Each row (column) corresponds to the action of the row (column) player,
i.e., cooperation (C) or defection (D). Because T > R and P > S, mutual defection is the
only Nash equilibrium of the single-shot game. Unless otherwise stated, we assume a standard
payoff matrix for the PD given by R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 1.
A pair of players play the PD for a predetermined number of rounds denoted by tmax.
We denote the round by t (= 1, 2, . . .). Although the Nash equilibrium of the iterated PD
is defection in all the rounds, which can be derived by backward induction, we assume for
simplicity that players do not carry out backward induction. We could avoid this technical
subtlety by assuming that a next round occurs with a certain probability such that the last
round is not known beforehand (Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006).
To model a learning player, we use a variant of the BM reinforcement learning model adapted
to the game situation, pioneered in Rapoport and Chammah (1965). Our model is a variant of
the BM model with the adaptive aspiration level (Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999;
Macy & Flache, 2002).
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In round t, the BM player intends to cooperate with probability pt. We set the initial
condition to p1 = 0.5. In addition, we assume that the player misimplements the action (i.e.,
C or D) to play the opposite action with a small probability ǫ. The payoff that the BM player
gains in round t is denoted as rt ∈ {R, T, S, P}. We define the stimulus, or the reinforcement
signal, using the sigmoidal function as
st = tanh [β(rt − At)] , (2)
where At is the aspiration level in round t above which the BM player satisfices. The degree
of satisfaction is parametrized by st, and −1 < st < 1 holds true. If st > 0 (st < 0), the BM
player is motivated to keep (switch) the current action in the next round. The sensitivity of
the stimulus to the reinforcement signal rt −At is parametrized by β ≥ 0.
The dynamics of the probability of cooperation are given by
pt+1 =


pt + (1− pt)st, (Action in round t = C, and st ≥ 0),
pt + ptst, (Action in round t = C, and st < 0),
pt − ptst, (Action in round t = D, and st ≥ 0),
pt − (1− pt)st, (Action in round t = D, and st < 0).
(3)
Finally, the dynamics of the aspiration level are given by
At+1 = (1− h)At + hrt, (4)
where h represents the learning rate of the aspiration level, which is also called habitua-
tion (Macy & Flache, 2002). In contrast to previous models in which h decays as t increases
(Erev & Roth, 1998; Cho & Matsui, 2005), we assume that h is a fixed constant. Unless oth-
erwise stated, we set the initial value of At to A1 = (R + T + S + P )/4, which is equal
to the expected payoff when there are an equal number of cooperators and defectors in a
population. As a remark, the possibility of cooperation in the iterated PD and other games
was examined when the update of At is driven by the average payoff over time (Kim, 1999;
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Cho & Matsui, 2005), the maximal experienced payoffs (Pazgal, 1997), or the payoff averaged
over the population (Palomino & Vega-Redondo, 1999; Oechssler, 2002).
The difference between our model and the Macy–Flache model (Macy & Flache, 2002) lies
in Eq. (2). Macy and Flache use st = ℓ(rt − At)/max[T − At, At − S] instead of Eq. (2). As
described below, this difference results in a remarkable difference in the behavior of the player.
In other words, we show that reacting strongly to the play in the previous round (i.e., large β) is
necessary for mutual cooperation. A deterministic decision maker with the adaptive aspiration
level used in Posch et al. (1999) corresponds to β = ∞. We numerically show that β does
not have to be extremely large for mutual cooperation. We remark that, if β = ∞ and the
aspiration level is fixed (i.e., h = 0), the strategy is a win-stay lose-shift one. In particular, our
BMmodel with β =∞ and h = 0 is equivalent to the Pavlov strategy (Kraines & Kraines, 1989;
Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) if P < At < R.
3 Results
3.1 BM versus BM
In this section, we examine the performance of a BM player playing against another BM player.
We assume that the two players employ the same values of β and h. For a range of β and h,
the fraction of the rounds in which the focal BM player cooperates is shown for three values
of implementation error, ǫ = 0, 0.01, 0.1, and two values of the number of rounds, tmax = 100,
1000, in Fig. 1. The presented values are averages over 100 trials in this and the following
figures unless otherwise stated. The fraction of cooperation is large when h is small and β is
large. The results are fairly robust, despite some degradation, even under 10% of the error in
the action implementation (Fig. 1(c, f)). Remarkably, a large fraction of cooperation can be
established only after tmax = 100 rounds (Fig. 1(d, e, f)). These results are in contrast to those
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for other reinforcement learning models for social dilemma games, where the establishment of
mutual cooperation requires a large number of rounds (Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009) or is sim-
ply difficult (Macy, 1996; Sandholm & Crites, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Taiji & Ikegami, 1999;
Macy & Flache, 2002; Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009).
In Fig. 1, β must be larger than approximately 2.7 for the fraction of cooperation to be large
for small h. When β is in this range, Eq. (2) suggests that the reinforcement signal st would
be typically close to −1 or 1 before a possible equilibrium is reached. This is because |rt −At|
is typically about unity or larger when R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 1. Then, Eq. (3) implies
that pt is close to 0 or 1, and the selection of the action tends to be almost deterministic. This
deterministic nature of the BM player seems to pave the way to mutual cooperation. This
result is consistent with those obtained from other models of reinforcement learning with the
adaptive aspiration level (Palomino & Vega-Redondo, 1999; Oechssler, 2002).
Some mutual cooperation also occurs in the Macy–Flache original BM model with the
adaptive aspiration level (Macy & Flache, 2002). For the sake of comparison, the fraction of
cooperation in the Macy–Flache model with ǫ = 0 and tmax = 1000 is shown in Fig. 2 for
various values of h and the sensitivity to the stimulus ℓ. The fraction of cooperation is much
smaller than that for our model. We consider that this is because the stimulus st with which
to update the probability to cooperate in the next round is not sufficiently sensitive to the
reinforcement signal rt − At in the Macy–Flache model. To satisfy −1 ≤ st ≤ 1 such that
Eq. (3) is well-defined, we need ℓ ≤ 1. Then, st would not be close to −1 or 1 in a considerable
number of rounds. Then, the action in the next round is not likely to be very sensitive to the
result of the game in the current round. Regardless of the value of ℓ, Macy’s model roughly
corresponds to our model with a small value of β. This interpretation is consistent with the
result that a small β yields a small fraction of cooperation in our model (Fig. 1).
Our results are also consistent with those in Posch et al. (1999), in which the authors
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analytically showed that mutual cooperation is difficult when h = 1 and β = ∞ (their
YESTERDAY strategy) and that mutual cooperation is established if the temptation pay-
off T is not too large when h is tiny and β = ∞ (their FARAWAY strategy). A sufficiently
small h combined with slight stochasticity in the dynamics of h also leads to mutual coopera-
tion (Karandikar et al., 1998). Our numerical results extend their analytical results in showing
that the BM players mutually cooperate up to an intermediate value of h if β is sufficiently
large.
To test the robustness of the results against changes in the payoff matrix, we set R = b− c,
T = b, S = −c, and P = 0, and measure the fraction of cooperation as a function of h and the
benefit-to-cost ratio b/c. We set β = 3, for which the BM player mutually cooperates when
R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, P = 1, and h is small (Fig. 1). The results for tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02,
and c = 1 are shown in Fig. 3. The cooperation decreases with an increase in h. Nevertheless,
the threshold value of b/c above which the BM players mutually cooperate with a probability
close to unity differs only slightly up to h ≈ 0.25.
A small h requires a relatively large number of rounds before the cooperative equilibrium is
reached, even if the parameter values are set to yield a cooperative equilibrium. The fraction
of cooperation when tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02, β = 3, R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 1 is
shown in Fig. 4 for various values of h and initial aspiration level A1. Figure 4 suggests that
h > 0.03 is necessary for h to relax to an equilibrium value within tmax = 1000 rounds. When
h is too small, the fraction of cooperation strongly depends on A1. If P < A1 < R, the BM
player is essentially the same as Pavlov for such a small h. In this case, mutual cooperation
is realized, reflecting the fact that Pavlov cooperates against itself (Kraines & Kraines, 1989;
Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). However, if we start from a different A1, the fraction of cooperation
would be small for a small value of h.
Two BM players may have different parameter values. Because Fig. 4 suggests that the
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value of A1 is irrelevant to the fraction of cooperation unless h is too small, we set A1 =
(R + T + S + P )/4 and examine the case in which two players have different values of h and
β. We set h = 0.3 and β = 3 for a focal BM player. For the opponent BM player with the
identical values of h and β, Figs. 1 and 3 guarantee that the two players mutually cooperate.
With tmax = 1000 and ǫ = 0.02, the fraction of cooperation and the mean payoff for the
focal player when the opponent has different values of h and β are shown in Fig. 5(a) and
5(b), respectively. Figure 5(a) indicates that the focal BM player mostly cooperates with the
opponent with similar values of h and β. Although the fraction of cooperation is small when
the opponent has small β, the focal BM player avoids being exploited by the opponent in this
way (Fig. 5(b)). In both cases, the focal BM player performs well against the BM opponent.
3.2 BM against reactive strategies
We examine the behavior of the BM player against players adopting the reactive strategy.
A reactive strategy is an often used non-learning strategy, and it is specified by two param-
eters p and q (p, q ∈ [0, 1]) and the initial condition. The reactive player cooperates with
probabilities p and q when the opponent cooperates and defects in the previous round, re-
spectively (Nowak & Sigmund, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992; Nowak, 2006). Unconditional
cooperation (ALLC), unconditional defection (ALLD), and TFT correspond to (p, q) = (1, 1),
(0, 0), and (1, 0), respectively. We assume that a player with the reactive strategy cooperates
in the first round.
The fraction of cooperation of the BM player against various reactive strategies is shown
in Fig. 6(a) for tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02, h = 0.3, and β = 3. The BM player rarely cooperates
with ALLC and ALLD. To never cooperate is the optimal action against these two strategies.
The BM player cooperates with TFT in approximately half the rounds. This is not an optimal
behavior; perpetual cooperation is optimal when the opponent is TFT (Axelrod, 1984). The
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mean payoff for the BM player against the reactive strategy is shown in Fig. 6(d). For all the
values of p and q, the mean aspiration level of the BM player is indistinguishable from the mean
payoff shown in Fig. 6(d). As already implied in Fig. 6(a), the BM player exploits ALLC and
gains more than 4.5 per round. The BM is not exploited by ALLD and gains approximately
P = 1 per round. The BM player gains approximately 2.5 per round against TFT. This
value is smaller than but not too far from R = 3 per round, which would be obtained by
mutual cooperation with TFT. Figure 6(a) shows that the BM player cooperates with a large
probability with generous tit-for-tat (GTFT) defined by p = 1 and q = 1/3 for the current
payoff matrix. GTFT is a strong competitor in the iterated PD (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992).
Although the BM player occasionally defects against GTFT, the BM player gains ≈ R = 3 per
round, which would be obtained by mutual cooperation.
The BM player does not play optimally against TFT. However, the BM player is gen-
erally strong against reactive strategies, as compared to TFT and GTFT. To support this,
we plot the fraction of cooperation and the mean payoff for TFT against the reactive strat-
egy in Fig. 6(b) and 6(e), respectively. The plotted values are analytical solutions obtained
by Nowak and Sigmund (Nowak & Sigmund, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1990; Nowak, 1990;
Nowak, 2006), which are summarized in Appendix for completeness. As shown in Fig. 6(b),
TFT does not cooperate with itself because TFT is intolerant to haphazard defection of the
opponent (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992). In addition, TFT does not exploit ALLC. This is why
TFT is eventually invaded by ALLD in evolutionary simulations in which ALLC, ALLD, and
TFT coexist (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). The payoff for TFT against
the reactive strategy (Fig. 6(e)) is smaller than that for the BM player (Fig. 6(d)) for a wide
range of p and q. This is particularly true for large values of p, which encompass TFT, GTFT,
and ALLC.
The fraction of cooperation and the mean payoff for GTFT player against the reactive
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strategy are shown in Fig. 6(c) and 6(f), respectively (see Appendix for derivation). The
GTFT player performs better than the BM player and TFT for large p. However, GTFT is
too generous to ALLC and ALLD. When p and q are both small or both large, the payoff for
GTFT (Fig. 6(f)) is smaller than that for the BM player (Fig. 6(d)). In addition, the payoff
for GTFT and that for the BM player are comparable when q > p and when (p, q) is close to
that of GTFT. On the basis of these numerical results, we conclude that the performance of
the BM player against the reactive strategy is comparable to that of GTFT.
3.3 Evolutionary simulations
If the BM player is a strong competitor in the iterated PD, it should be able to evolve in a
population in which different strategies coexist. To examine this point, we simulate evolutionary
dynamics of populations where BM players and non-learners coexist in the beginning. We model
non-learners by the stochastic memory-one strategy with which the player determines an action
based on its own action and that of the opponent in the previous round (Nowak et al., 1995).
There are four types of outcomes of the pairwise interaction in a round, i.e., CC, CD, DC,
and DD. The first and second letters (i.e., C or D) represent the actions of the focal player
obeying the memory-one strategy (memory-one player for short) and the opponent, respectively.
The memory-one player is parametrized by the action in the first round and four probabilities
pCC, pCD, pDC, and pDD. The probability corresponding to the outcome of the present round
is used as the probability that the memory-one player cooperates in the next round. For
example, if both players cooperate, the memory-one player cooperates with probability pCC in
the next round. Initially, the memory-one player is assumed to cooperate with probability pCC.
The memory-one strategy includes many important strategies such as the reactive strategy and
Pavlov (Nowak et al., 1995). We assume pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD ∈ {0, 1/m, 2/m, . . . , (m−1)/m, 1}
and that there are initially an equal number of memory-one players of each type. The case
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m = 3 with a slight modification is employed in a previous study (Hauert & Stenull, 2002). To
be realistic, we assume that both the memory-one player and the BM player misimplement the
intended action with probability ǫ = 0.02.
We denote the number of players in the population by N . Each player in the population
plays against each of the other N − 1 players iteratively for tmax = 1000 rounds in a single
generation. The results shown in the following are qualitatively the same if tmax is reduced
to 500. We normalize the payoff of each player by dividing it by (N − 1)tmax such that the
payoff per generation falls between S and T . We update the strategy of the players during evo-
lutionary dynamics according to the Fermi rule (Szabo´ & To˝ke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006).
At the end of each generation, we pick a pair of players i and j from the population with
equal probability. We denote their single-generation payoffs as r(i) and r(j). With probability
1/
[
1 + exp
(
β˜(r(i) − r(j))
)]
, player i copies the strategy of player j. With the remaining prob-
ability, player j copies the strategy of player i. We set β˜ = 1. If the parent (i.e., player whose
strategy is copied) is the BM player, the child (i.e., player copying the strategy of the parent)
becomes the BM learner. In this case, both the parent and the child start with pt=1 = 0.5 and
At=1 = (R + T + S + P )/4 in the next generation. If the parent is a memory-one player, the
child inherits the parent’s parameter values pCC, pCD, pDC, and pDD. For simplicity, we do not
consider mutations.
To examine the possibility that the BM player invades a population of players with various
memory-one strategies, we start evolutionary simulations with 1% of the BM players in a
population. Two time courses of typical runs when h = 0.3 and β = 3 are shown in Fig. 7. In
Fig. 7(a), we set m = 3 and prepare 10 memory-one players of each of the 44 = 256 types and
25 BM players in the beginning. Therefore, N = 2560 + 25 = 2585. In Fig. 7(b), we set m = 5
and prepare two memory-one players of each of the 66 = 1296 types and 25 BM players in the
beginning. Therefore, N = 2592 + 25 = 2617. In both cases, the BM players can invade the
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population of memory-one players to eventually become dominant. Within the memory-one
players, those with large pCC tend to survive at early stages of evolutionary dynamics before
they are overwhelmed by the BM player.
4 Discussion
We numerically analyzed the behavior of a BM model in the iterated PD. Our model is a
modification of the BM model used by Macy and Flache (2002) such that the probability of
cooperation in the next round is made sensitive to the reinforcement signal obtained in the
current round. Our model is also a close variant of the models used by Karandikar et al.
(1998) and Posch et al. (1999). When the adaptation of the aspiration level is not too fast, the
modified BM player mutually cooperates with a large probability. The BM player also performs
efficiently against reactive strategies and in evolutionary dynamics in a population comprising
various memory-one strategies. Up to our numerical efforts, the results are robust against the
error in the action implementation and the change in the payoff matrix describing the PD.
The BM player performs at least comparably to memory-one players such as GTFT and
Pavlov, which are strong competitors in the iterated PD. Although the BM player is infe-
rior to these strategies when playing against TFT, it performs better than GTFT against
other strategies including ALLC and ALLD. In an evolutionary context, naively cooperat-
ing with ALLC allows it to prosper by a neutral drift, which eventually invites the inva-
sion of malicious players such as ALLD. Therefore, it is important to be able to exploit
ALLC for a strategy to survive in evolutionary dynamics (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). This
property is not satisfied by TFT (Axelrod, 1984), GTFT (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992), Pavlov
(Kraines & Kraines, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993), and BM model with a fixed aspiration
level (Macy, 1991; Macy, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002). In contrast, our BM
player as well as the temporal difference learner (Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009) are capable of ex-
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ploiting ALLC.
As a model of humans and other animals in iterated games, a learning strategy may
be generally disadvantageous as compared to simpler learning strategies and non-learning
strategies in at least two aspects. First, the number of rounds before learning is estab-
lished may be large. For example, the temporal difference learning, a type of reinforcement
learning, must be implemented with a very small learning rate to realize mutual cooperation
(Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009). In contrast, the learning of the modified BM model is completed in
one to some hundreds of rounds. This speed of learning is comparable to that of other learning
models in which mutual cooperation is obtained within ten to hundred rounds (Macy, 1991;
Macy, 1996; Erev & Roth, 1998; Erev & Roth, 2001; Hauert & Stenull, 2002; Macy & Flache, 2002).
Second, humans or other animals subjected to social dilemma situations may not implement
a complex learning strategy. In this aspect, the BM model with the adaptive aspiration
level, both the original ones (Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002)
and ours, has a clear advantage. The BM model is simpler than many learning models in-
cluding the temporal difference learning (Sandholm & Crites, 1996; Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009),
fictitious play (Erev & Roth, 1998; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Camerer, 2003), genetic algo-
rithms (Macy, 1996), and artificial neural networks (Macy, 1996; Sandholm & Crites, 1996;
Taiji & Ikegami, 1999; Gutnisky & Zanutto, 2004).
The memory-one strategy, for example, can be regarded as a reinforcement learning because
the probability of cooperation is a function of the outcome in the previous round. This is also
the case for analogous strategies with longer memory (Lindgren, 1991). Nevertheless, in this
study, we are concerned with the cases where the probabilities of cooperation conditioned by the
recent results of the game adapt over time. In the case of the BM model, adaptation is realized
by the dynamic aspiration level. Learning players in this restricted sense cope with various
types of opponents more flexibly than the memory-one strategy or its extension with longer
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memory. For example, we showed that the mean aspiration level of the BM player is almost
equal to the mean payoff against different reactive strategies (Sec. 3.2). This result indicates
that the BM player flexibly behaves as different types of win-stay lose-shift strategists depending
on the opponent. Learning in games is a recent outstanding issue involving interdisciplinary
research fields such as behavioral game theory and neuroeconomics (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998;
Camerer, 2003; Glimcher et al., 2009). Because the effect of learning is evident in laboratory
experiments (Camerer, 2003; Glimcher et al., 2009), it may be important to consider individual
learning in addition to evolution to understand the behavior of agents, particularly that of
humans, in social dilemma situations. Our model, which is simple yet competitive in the PD,
may be used for examining various problems with regard to relationships between learning and
cooperation in social dilemma situations.
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Appendix: Reactive strategy against itself
When the focal player obeys the reactive strategy with parameters p and q, the long-term behav-
ior of the focal player against the reactive strategy with parameters p and q can be analytically
calculated (Nowak & Sigmund, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1990; Nowak, 1990; Nowak, 2006).
The probability that the focal player cooperates is given by
s1 =
q(p− q) + q
1− (p− q)(p− q)
. (5)
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The mean payoff of the focal player is given by
Rs1s2 + Ss1(1− s2) + T (1− s1)s2 + P (1− s1)(1− s2), (6)
where s1 is given by Eq. (5) and
s2 =
q(p− q) + q
1− (p− q)(p− q)
. (7)
References
[Axelrod, 1984] Axelrod, R. 1984. Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, NY.
[Bendor et al., 2003] Bendor, J., Diermeier, D. & Ting, M. 2003. A behavioral model of
turnout. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 97 (2), 261–280.
[Bo¨rgers & Sarin, 2000] Bo¨rgers, T. & Sarin, R. 2000. Naive reinforcement learning with en-
dogenous aspirations. Int. Econ. Rev. 41 (4), 921–950.
[Boyd & Richerson, 1985] Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary
Process. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[Camerer, 2003] Camerer, C. F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press,
NJ.
[Cho & Matsui, 2005] Cho, I. K. & Matsui, A. 2005. Learning aspiration in repeated games.
J. Econ. Theory, 124 (2), 171–201.
[Cross, 1983] Cross, J. G. 1983. A Theory of Adaptive Economic Behavior. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge.
[Daw & Doya, 2006] Daw, N. D. & Doya, K. 2006. The computational neurobiology of learning
and reward. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 16, 199–204.
18
[Dixon, 2000] Dixon, H. D. 2000. Keeping up with the joneses: competition and the evolution
of collusion. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 43 (2), 223–238.
[Erev & Roth, 1998] Erev, I. & Roth, A. E. 1998. Predicting how people play games: reinforce-
ment learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. Amer. Econ.
Rev. 88, 848–881.
[Erev & Roth, 2001] Erev, I. & Roth, A. E. 2001. Simple reinforcement learning models and
reciprocation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In: Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. (Eds.), The
Adaptive Toolbox, pp. 215–231.
[Fudenberg & Levine, 1998] Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. 1998. The Theory of Learning in
Games. MIT Press, MA.
[Glimcher et al., 2009] Glimcher, P. W., Camerer, C. F., Fehr, E. & Poldrack, R. A. 2009.
Neuroeconomics – Decision Making and the Brain. Academic Press, London.
[Gutnisky & Zanutto, 2004] Gutnisky, D. A. & Zanutto, B. S. 2004. Cooperation in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma is learned by operant conditioning mechanisms. Artif. Life, 10 (4), 433–
461.
[Hauert & Stenull, 2002] Hauert, C. & Stenull, O. 2002. Simple adaptive strategy wins the
prisoner’s dilemma. J. Theor. Biol. 218 (3), 261–272.
[Izquierdo et al., 2007] Izquierdo, L. R., Izquierdo, S. S., Gotts, N. M. & Polhill, J. G. 2007.
Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games. Games Econ. Behav.
61 (2), 259–276.
[Izquierdo et al., 2008] Izquierdo, S. S., Izquierdo, L. R. & Gotts, N. M. 2008. Reinforcement
learning dynamics in social dilemmas. J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul. 11 (2), 1.
19
[Karandikar et al., 1998] Karandikar, R., Mookherjee, D., Ray, D. & Vega-Redondo, F. 1998.
Evolving aspirations and cooperation. J. Econ. Theory, 80 (2), 292–331.
[Kim, 1999] Kim, Y. 1999. Satisficing and optimality in 2 × 2 common interest games. Econ.
Theory, 13 (2), 365–375.
[Kraines & Kraines, 1989] Kraines, D. & Kraines, V. 1989. Pavlov and the prisoner’s dilemma.
Theory Decis. 26 (1), 47–79.
[Lindgren, 1991] Lindgren, K. 1991. Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics. Proceedings
of Artificial Life II, pp. 295–312.
[Macy, 1996] Macy, M. 1996. Natural selection and social learning in prisoner’s dilemma. Sociol.
Methods Res. 25 (1), 103–137.
[Macy, 1991] Macy, M. W. 1991. Learning to cooperate: stochastic and tacit collusion in social
exchange. Am. J. Sociol. 97 (3), 808–843.
[Macy & Flache, 2002] Macy, M. W. & Flache, A. 2002. Learning dynamics in social dilemmas.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 99, 7229–7236.
[Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009] Masuda, N. & Ohtsuki, H. 2009. A theoretical analysis of temporal
difference learning in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Bull. Math. Biol. 71, 1818–1850.
[Montague & Berns, 2002] Montague, P. R. & Berns, G. S. 2002. Neural economics and the
biological substrates of valuation. Neuron, 36, 265–284.
[Napel, 2003] Napel, S. 2003. Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. Games
Econom. Behav. 43 (1), 86–106.
20
[Nowak, 1990] Nowak, M. 1990. Stochastic strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma. Theor. Popul.
Biol. 38, 93–112.
[Nowak & Sigmund, 1989] Nowak, M. & Sigmund, K. 1989. Game-dynamical aspects of the
prisoner’s dilemma. Applied Math. Comput. 30, 191–213.
[Nowak & Sigmund, 1990] Nowak, M. & Sigmund, K. 1990. The evolution of stochastic strate-
gies in the prisoner’s dilemma. Acta Applicandae Math. 20, 247–265.
[Nowak & Sigmund, 1993] Nowak, M. & Sigmund, K. 1993. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift
that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature, 364, 56–58.
[Nowak, 2006] Nowak, M. A. 2006. Evolutionary Dynamics. The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, MA.
[Nowak & Sigmund, 1992] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. 1992. Tit for tat in heterogeneous
populations. Nature, 355, 250–253.
[Nowak et al., 1995] Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K. & El-Sedy, E. 1995. Automata, repeated
games and noise. J. Math. Biol. 33 (7), 703–722.
[Oechssler, 2002] Oechssler, J. 2002. Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels.
J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 49 (3), 405–409.
[Palomino & Vega-Redondo, 1999] Palomino, F. & Vega-Redondo, F. 1999. Convergence of
aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. Int. J. Game Theory, 28 (4),
465–488.
[Pazgal, 1997] Pazgal, A. 1997. Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games. Int.
J. Game Theory, 26 (4), 439–453.
21
[Posch et al., 1999] Posch, M., Pichler, A. & Sigmund, K. 1999. The efficiency of adapting
aspiration levels. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 266 (1427), 1427–1435.
[Rapoport & Chammah, 1965] Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. M. 1965. Prisoner’s Dilemma:
A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
[Sandholm & Crites, 1996] Sandholm, T. W. & Crites, R. H. 1996. Multiagent reinforcement
learning in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Biosystems, 37 (1-2), 147–166.
[Schultz et al., 1997] Schultz, W., Dayan, P. & Montague, P. R. 1997. A neural substrate of
prediction and reward. Science, 275, 1593–1599.
[Sigmund, 2010] Sigmund, K. 2010. The Calculus of Selfishness. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
[Simon, 1959] Simon, H. A. 1959. Theories of decision-making in economics and behavioral
science. Amer. Econ. Rev. 49 (3), 253–283.
[Szabo´ & To˝ke, 1998] Szabo´, G. & To˝ke, C. 1998. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a
square lattice. Phys. Rev. E, 58 (1), 69–73.
[Taiji & Ikegami, 1999] Taiji, M. & Ikegami, T. 1999. Dynamics of internal models in game
players. Physica D, 134 (2), 253–266.
[Traulsen et al., 2006] Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A. & Pacheco, J. M. 2006. Stochastic dynamics
of invasion and fixation. Phys. Rev. E, 74 (1), 011909.
[Trivers, 1971] Trivers, R. L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46,
35–57.
22
Figure 1: Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM player. The
number of rounds is equal to (a–c) tmax = 1000 and (d–f) tmax = 100. The probability of the
misimplementation of the action is equal to (a, d) ǫ = 0, (b, e) ǫ = 0.01, and (c, f) ǫ = 0.1. We
set R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 1, and vary h and β.
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Figure 2: Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM player in the
Macy–Flache model. We set tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0, R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 1, and vary h
and ℓ.
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Figure 3: Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM player. We
set tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02, β = 3, c = 1, R = b− c, T = b, S = −c, and P = 0, and vary h and
b/c.
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Figure 4: Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM player. We
set tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02, β = 3, R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 1, and vary h and A1.
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Figure 5: Behavior of a focal BM player with h = 0.3 and β = 3 against a BM opponent with
different values of h and β. (a) Fraction of cooperation and (b) mean payoff of the focal BM
player. We set tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02, R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, and P = 1.
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Figure 6: Fraction of cooperation of (a) BM player, (b) TFT, and (c) GTFT against reactive
strategies. We set tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02, h = 0.3, β = 3, R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, and P = 1.
Mean payoff of (d) BM player, (e) TFT, and (f) GTFT against reactive strategies.
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Figure 7: Time courses of evolutionary dynamics. We set tmax = 1000, ǫ = 0.02, h = 0.3,
β = 3, R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 1. (a) Results for N = 2585, m = 3, and 44 types
of memory-one strategies. (b) Results for N = 2617, m = 5, and 64 types of memory-one
strategies.
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